Broadie notes in his preface that the trouble with the Meditations is "that since the work is short and well written one has finished it before one has properly begun to grasp the vast issues with which Descartes engages." To overcome this trouble he turns to Descartes for advice. Descartes notes in his "Preface to the Reader" that he would never advise anyone to read the Meditations excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with him. Broadie takes Descartes at his (...) word, "and accordingly the present work is not so much a text book, or a commentary, as an attempt to reconstruct his ‘Treatise’ afresh. Therefore, it is not a series of reflections, but a sustained attempt to discover what is central in the Meditations, and to treat the work as Descartes urged us to." Paralleling the Meditations, the Approach is divided into six chapters. Its external features, other than an index, may be noted by their absence. Missing are the usual notes, bibliography, and references to the literature, which one is used to seeing in a scholarly work. Also, Broadie side-steps questions of translation from the Latin and French, choosing instead to rely exclusively on the Haldane and Ross translation. With all of this, however, what is missing is not a loss. He does give us a scholarly treatment of the Meditations, one which stands on its own analysis. The Approach is a worthwhile addition to the Cartesian literature. In it, Broadie attains his objective of reconstructing Descartes’ ‘Treatise’ afresh, and provides, in addition, a competent handling of the issues and thread of the argument.—D. R. P. (shrink)

As seen by Professor Capek, Bergson’s views about the nature of matter were either misunderstood or ignored in the decades following their publication at the turn of the century. The explanation for this attitude of both Bergson’s opponents and his disciples lies in the fact that, at that time, although there were rumblings under the foundations of classical physics, "hardly anybody could then guess even remotely the extent of the coming scientific revolution." One of the main stumbling blocks for Bergson’s (...) readers was the non-pictorial character of his ‘model’ of matter, which was conceived as consisting of imageless events. In Bergson and Modern Physics, Capek attempts to remove this stumbling block and to evaluate the relation between Bergson’s thought and modern physics as it stands today. The book consists of three parts: Bergson’s biological theory of knowledge, his theory of duration, and his theory of the physical world and its relations to contemporary physics. Three appendices deal with Russell’s complex relation to Bergson, with the much discussed relation of microphysical indeterminancy to freedom, and with Bergson’s views on entropy and modern cosmogony, respectively. The book is indexed and carries extensive references to the scientific and philosophical literature. With this book Capek provides a competent exposition and historical perspective of Bergson’s philosophy and its relation to modern physics.—D. R. P. (shrink)

With the subtitle, "A consideration of some aspects of An Essay concerning Human Understanding," this book concentrates on Locke’s doctrine of natural or scientific laws and our knowledge of them. By dealing with a limited theme, Woolhouse feels that he is able to provide a treatment lengthier than usual of central topics of Locke’s thought. The topics selected are: "trifling" and "instructive" propositions; "certain knowledge" and "probable opinion"; the notion of an "idea"; simple and complex ideas; the distinction between modes (...) and substances; the notions of Substance, and of real and nominal essences. In elaborating these topics, Woolhouse tries to pay great attention to the actual text of the Essay and to the adequacy or inadequacy of its interpretation by recent commentators. In addition, he has "tried to explain and evaluate Locke’s thought in terms of the positions, views, and interests of twentieth-century philosophy." The book is based on Woolhouse’s Ph.D. thesis at Cambridge in 1968 entitled, ‘Natural necessity in Locke’s Essay and some recent philosophy'. It includes an eight page bibliography of works referred to and a ten page index.—D. R. P. (shrink)

For those who like to locate a subject matter within some familiar context before plunging into its content, this book offers a formidable barrier. Bahm has provided neither preface nor introduction to his work. His book presents three loosely connected studies dealing with polarity, dialectic, and negation, with a final chapter on "Organicity," where we discover that Bahm is introducing us to a new philosophy which he calls "organicism." Organicism distinguishes the categories of existence and experience as ultimate and interdependent. (...) It aims "to be anti-reductionistic, i.e. to refuse to reduce existence to experience and to reduce experience to existence whether experienced or not." "As a both-and philosophy," organicism "claims to account for both existence and experience; and for both experienced existence and unexperienced existence, and for both what is experienced as existing and what is experienced as not existing (million dollars in my pocket." Bahm proposes "two lists of categorial polarities for further study. "The two lists will serve as an outline for a work program by the author who aims to explore each pair, both in itself and in relation to every other pair in the same list. That is, two sets of volumes, one on Existence and one on Experience, are projected." The three studies presented in the volume under review are interesting in their own right. However, the book suffers for lack of an introductory essay.--D. R. P. (shrink)